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Sales
By Keith A. Rowley, Robyn L. Meadows, Larry T Garvin, and Carolyn L. Dessin*
SCOPE OF ARTICLE 2
Article 2 applies to "transactions in goods,"' and defines "goods" to include
tangible personal property that is moveable at the time of identification to the
contract.2 The court in Adel v. Greensprings of Vermont, Inc.3 sided with a majority
of jurisdictions in holding that water is a good, the provision of which by a
privately-owned supplier is a transaction within the scope of Article 2.
In Heuerman v. B & M Construction, Inc. ,4 the court reiterated that Illinois courts
use the "predominant purpose" test, rather than the "gravamen of the action" test,
to decide whether Article 2 governs "mixed" goods and services contracts, 5 and
held that a contract to provide gravel for a highway repair project was predomi-
nantly for services because the seller purchased the gravel from a third party, the
seller's primary business was trucking, not gravel sales, and nearly two-thirds of
the contract price was for transportation charges. 6 In a similar vein, the court in
Fallsview Glatt Kosher Caterers, Inc. v. Rosenfeld 7 ruled that an alleged agreement
for "accommodations, food and entertainment," as part of a "Kosher Passover
experience," was predominantly for services, and thus Article 2 did not apply to
even the food portion of the contract.
CONTRACT FORMATION
In Enpro Systems, Ltd. v. Namasco Corp.," Enpro ordered steel plates from Na-
masco. Namasco attempted to limit warranty claims and remedies by the terms
noted on the invoice it sent Enpro, which Enpro did not receive until three days
* Keith A. Rowley is Professor of Law at the William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada
Las Vegas, and co-chair of the Sale of Goods Subcommittee. Robyn L. Meadows is Professor of Law
at Widener University School of Law in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania and an editor of the Annual U.C.C.
Survey Larry T. Garvin is Professor of Law at the Moritz College of Law, The Ohio State University
Carolyn L. Dessin is Associate Professor at the University of Akron School of Law.
1. See U.C.C. § 2-102 (2002).
2. See id. § 2-105(1).
3. 363 F Supp. 2d 692, 56 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 798 (D. Vt. 2005). As a result, the seller
made and could breach the warranty of merchantability by providing water containing pathogens.
4. 833 N.E.2d 382 (I1. App. Ct. 2005).
5. See id. at 388-89.
6. See id. at 389.
7. 794 N.Y.S.2d 790 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2005).
8. 382 F Supp. 2d 874 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
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after it received the goods. The court found that the parties' contract formed either
when Namasco timely shipped goods conforming to Enpro's purchase order or
when the goods arrived at Enpro's receiving department-each of which occurred
prior to Enpro's receipt of Namasco's invoice. Accordingly, the court concluded
that the invoice terms were not part of the parties' contract. 9
STATUTE OF FRAUDS
Agreements to buy and sell goods for a price of $500 or more must normally
be evidenced by one or more signed writings to be enforceable.' 0 The court in
International Casings Group, Inc v. Premium Standard Farms, Inc." enjoined an out-
put seller from terminating its relationship with the buyer, holding that the buyer
was likely to prevail on the merits of its argument that an exchange of seventeen
e-mail messages sufficiently evidenced the parties' agreement to a three-year out-
put contract to satisfy U.C.C. section 2-201(1). 12 Although the e-mail exchanges
referenced the parties' intention to reduce their agreement to writing, the court
concluded that this was more likely a memorialization than a condition precedent
to formation.
13
Even when there is no writing signed by the person against whom enforcement
is sought, the statute of frauds will not bar an action if the defendant is a merchant
who received but did not object to a written confirmation sent by the plaintiff.' 4
The court in R.E Cunningham & Co., Inc. v. Driscoll,' 5 recognizing a sharp split
among other jurisdictions regarding whether a farmer can be an Article 2 mer-
chant, ' 6 held that a farmer with 37 years of experience harvesting and selling
soybeans was a merchant for this purpose. In a troubling decision, a Texas court
of appeals held that a merchant seller of cell phone battery pack components
could not avoid a forum selection clause included in a buyer's written confir-
mations of orders placed over the telephone.' 7 The court's ruling totally miscon-
strues U.C.C. section 2-201(2). That provision may deny a merchant the ability
to invoke the statute of frauds defense, but it does not deny the merchant the
ability to challenge the existence of a contract and says absolutely nothing about
the terms of the contract. The court's ultimate conclusion may, however, be correct
under U.C.C. section 2-207, to which we turn next.
9. See id. at 880-81 (citing Texas's version of U.C.C. § 2-206(1)(b) (2002)). Enpro raises a number
of additional Article 2 issues and should be on every commercial lawyer's reading list.
10. See U.C.C. § 2-201 (2002).
11. 358 F Supp. 2d 863, 56 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 736 (WD. Mo. 2005).
12. Id. at 872-75, 56 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 744-48. The court found support in Missouri's
enactment of the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA), Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 432.200-432.295
(Supp. 2005). See 358 E Supp. 2d at 873, 875, 56 U.C.C. Rep. Serm 2d (West) at 748.
13. 358 F Supp. 2d at 871, 56 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 742.
14. See U.C.C. § 2-201(2).
15. 790 N.Y.S.2d 368, 56 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 237 (N.Y. City Ct. 2005).
16. See id. at 369, 56 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 238 (citing David B. Harrison, Annotation,
Sales-Farmers as "Merchants" Within Provisions of UCC Article 2, 95 A.L.R.3D 484 (collecting cases)).
17. See In re Kyocera Wireless Corp., 162 S.W3d 758 (Tex. App. 2005).
HeinOnline -- 61 Bus. Law 1546 2005-2006
Sales 1547
BATTLE OF THE FORMS
Between merchants, additional terms in a written acceptance or confirmation
can become part of the contract if the party receiving the acceptance or confir-
mation expressly assents or the terms are not material and the party receiving the
acceptance or confirmation of them does not object.' 8 In Borden Chemical, Inc. v.
Jahn Foundry Corp.,9 the court held that an indemnification provision included
in Borden's invoice materially altered the terms of Jahn's purchase order and,
therefore, did not become part of the contract. Borden argued that it had included
an identical provision, to which Jahn had never objected, in numerous invoices
it sent Jahn over a span of several years--establishing a course of dealing that
made the indemnity provision part of the parties' contracts. The court disagreed
because Jahn had added express liability language to the purchase orders at issue.
Because Borden did not expressly condition its acceptance-by-invoice on Jahn's
assent to any additional or different terms contained therein, the new purchase
order language "undercut the parties' prior course of dealing and rendered the
invoices' indemnity agreement a material alteration to Jahn's purchase order."20
Furthermore, Jahn's purchasing manager's initialing each of Borden's invoices
containing the indemnity provision did not constitute an acceptance of any ad-
ditional or different terms; rather, he did so solely for the purpose of Jahn's internal
accounts payable procedures.21
In Lively v. IJAM, Inc. ,22 the court held that the parties had formed their contract
for the purchase and sale of a laptop computer when the buyer paid the purchase
price and the seller shipped the computer; therefore, a forum selection clause
included in the invoice accompanying the computer did not become part of the
contract. 23 Because the buyer did not expressly agree to the forum selection clause,
the court held that it was not part of the contract--either because the buyer was
not a merchant or, even if he was a merchant, because the forum selection clause
materially altered the terms of the pre-existing contract.24
Resolving the parties' dispute in AgGrow Oils, L.LC. v. National Union Fire In-
surance Co. of Pittsburgh, PA25 required applying the less-frequently-litigated
U.C.C. section 2-207(3). AgGrow engaged Ibberson to design and build an oilseed
processing plant, incorporating equipment manufactured by Anderson, about
which Anderson made quantity and quality guarantees. When the equipment
failed to live up to Anderson's guarantees, AgGrow sued Ibberson (and Ibberson's
surety, National Union), and Ibberson sought indemnity from Anderson. The
18. See U.C.C. § 2-207(2) (2002).
19. 834 N.E.2d 1227 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005), review denied, 840 N.E. 2d 55 (Mass. 2005).
20. Id. at 1230. The court applied the material alteration test in U.C.C. section 2-207(2)(b), rather
than the "knockout rule," because Massachusetts' non-uniform version of section 2-207(2) applies to
both additional and different terms. See MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 106 § 2-207(2) (West 1999).
21. See Borden Chemical, 834 N.E.2d at 1232.
22. 114 P.3d 487, 58 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 639 (Okla. Civ. App. 2005).
23. Id. at 492, 58 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 644. Compare Enpro Sys., Ltd. v. Namasco Corp.,
382 F Supp. 874 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (discussed supra in text accompanying note 8).
24. Lively, 114 P3d at 492-93, 58 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 644-45.
25. 420 E3d 751 (8th Cir. 2005).
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court found that Ibberson and Anderson had formed their contract through con-
duct: having exchanged written proposals and failed to reach an agreement on
the material terms through their writings, the parties nevertheless performed as
if they had agreed. Because both parties' writings incorporated Anderson's guar-
antees (which inured to AgGrow's benefit), those guarantees were terms on which




A contract for the sale of goods normally includes an implied warranty that the
goods are merchantable if the seller is a merchant engaged in the business of
selling goods of that kind.2 7 In Krack v. Action Motors Corp., the court held that a
used automobile dealer breached the implied warranty of merchantability when
it sold a salvaged vehicle for the price of a non-salvaged used vehicle, even though
the dealer had a clean certificate of title and did not know about the prior sal-
vage.28 The trial court held that, despite the defendant's innocence and the fact
that the vehicle ran well, the plaintiff was entitled to recover more than $9,700
because the value of this vehicle with a salvage history was roughly one-half that
of a comparable, non-salvaged vehicle.2 9 The appellate court affirmed, noting that
the implied warranty of merchantability assigns the risk of unknown defects to a
merchant seller, in order to protect buyers from loss sustained when the goods
did not meet commercial expectations. In this case, a vehicle with a salvage history
would not "pass without objection in the trade." 30 In the court's view, Connecti-
cut's "very strong policy in favor of protecting purchasers of consumer goods"
supported holding an innocent merchant seller liable for nonconformities.
3 1
In McDonald Brothers, Inc. v. Tinder Wholesale, LLC,32 a building materials sup-
plier (McDonald) purchased trim boards from a distributor of lumber products
(Tinder) for resale to contractors. After the boards were installed in construction
projects, several contractors notified McDonald that the boards were failing due
to improper application of adhesive during the manufacturing process. McDonald
paid substantial sums to repair and replace the boards but Tinder refused to
reimburse McDonald, despite promising to do so. McDonald sued for, inter alia,
breaches of an express warranty and the implied warranties of merchantability
and fitness for a particular purpose. The court denied Tinder's motions to dismiss
the express warranty and implied warranty of merchantability claims, but dis-
missed the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose claim because the
26. See id. at 754-55.
27. See U.C.C. § 2-314 (2002).
28. 867 A.2d 86, 56 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 368 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005), certification denied,
871 A.2d 1031 (Conn. 2005).
29. See id. at 88, 56 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 369.
30. See id. at 89-90, 56 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 369 (citing U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(a)).
31. Id. at 90, 56 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 372.
32. 395 F Supp. 2d 255, 57 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 615 (M.D.N.C. 2005).
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plaintiffs use of the boards was the ordinary use of the board and not for a
particular or unique purpose.3 3 The court relied on an official comment to U.C.C.
section 2-315, which explains that this warranty "envisages a specific use by the
buyer which is peculiar to the nature of his business whereas the ordinary pur-
poses for which goods are used are those envisaged in the concept of merchant-
ability" 34 The particular purpose alleged-installation in residential housing-was
the ordinary purpose of the boards; therefore, the claim failed.
PRIVITY OF CONTRACT
Several cases discussed whether Article 2 permits a buyer to recover non-
personal injury damages from a remote seller in the absence of privity of contract.
In Hyundai Motor America, Inc. v. Goodin,35 the Supreme Court of Indiana per-
mitted a consumer buyer (Goodin) to recover damages for economic loss based
on breach of the implied warranty of merchantability directly from a manufacturer.
Goodin purchased a new Hyundai Sonata from an Indiana Hyundai dealer.
Goodin experienced repeated problems with the vehicle's brakes, which were
never resolved. Goodin sued Hyundai for breaching both an express warranty
and the implied warranty of merchantability A jury found Hyundai breached the
implied warranty of merchantability, but not an express warranty, and awarded
$3,000 in damages. Hyundai appealed, claiming lack of privity precluded recov-
ery of damages for diminution in value, and the intermediate court of appeals
reversed. The Indiana Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals' decision and
affirmed the trial court, holding that vertical privity was not required in a claim
by a consumer against a manufacturer for breach of warranty even if the damages
were solely economic loss. 36 The court noted that, while the origins of the privity
requirement rested in nineteenth century law designed to limit tort liability for
breach of warranty, privity was no longer required in tort.37 The court explained,
further, that even in a contract claim, the privity requirement has been eroded by
the enactment of U.C.C. section 2-318, which eliminates horizontal privity re-
quirements for certain plaintiffs who sustain personal injuries as a result of a
breach of warranty 38
The court then looked to authority from other jurisdictions. The court noted
a split in authority among jurisdictions with the same version of section 2-318 as
Indiana but was persuaded to eliminate the vertical privity requirement for eco-
nomic loss because most products are sold through intermediaries, leaving con-
33. 395 E Supp. 2d at 266, 57 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 621.
34. Id., 57 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 622 (quoting U.C.C. § 2-315 cmt. 2).
35. 822 N.E.2d 947, 56 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 339 (Ind. 2005).
36. Id. at 953-58, 56 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 346-50.
37. Id. at 951-53, 56 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 343-46.
38. Id. at 954-56, 56 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 348-50 (citing Indiana's version of U.C.C.
section 2-318). Although section 2-318 does not address vertical privity or expressly permit recovery
for economic loss, the court found that the section did not prevent a court from abolishing the privity
requirement in such a case. See id. at 955-56, 56 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 349-50 (noting the
official Code comments carefully explain that section 2-318 is neutral on issue of vertical privity).
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sumers to discover defects in the goods after the sale;39 vertical privity can insulate
manufacturers from liability for inferior products;40 eliminating the privity re-
quirement may avoid a multiplicity of litigation, with each buyer suing its im-
mediate seller up the distribution chain;4 1 manufacturers often focus their product
promotion on the ultimate consumer;4 and, as some courts have observed, there
is no good reason for a distinction between personal injury and economic loss,
given that economic loss can be significant.13 The court found that these factors
outweighed the primary justification for a vertical privity requirement-allowing
the parties to allocate risks associated with defects in the goods themselves-
which the court concluded has been eroded by the protections the U.C.C. and
federal law provide to consumers.
44
Indeed, the buyer's expectations in this case would be particularly frustrated
by requiring vertical privity because a warranty disclaimer left no remedy against
the immediate seller and the economic loss rule45 barred any tort action against
the manufacturer. Therefore, unless the privity requirement was eliminated, the
buyer would be left with no remedy for Hyundai's breach of the implied war-
ranty of merchantability. Holding that consumers are entitled to expect that
goods will at least meet the minimum requirements of merchantability, the court
eliminated the vertical privity requirement, thus allowing suit directly against
the manufacturer.
46
In contrast, two federal district courts enforced the vertical privity requirement
of state law. In Monticello v. Winnebago Industries, Inc. 47 the court concluded that
the disappointed buyers of a recreational vehicle could not sue the manufacturer
39. See id. at 957, 56 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 351; see, e.g., Hininger v. Case Corp., 23 E3d
124, 24 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 58 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1079 (1995)
(applying Texas law); Reed v. City of Chicago, 263 F Supp. 2d 1123, 50 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West)
146 (N.D. 1l. 2003) (applying Illinois law); Hubbard v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 95 Civ. 4362, 1996
WL 274018, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 83 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 1996) (applying New York law).
40. Goodin, 822 N.E.2d at 957, 56 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 352 (citing Groppel Co., Inc. v.
U.S. Gypsum Co., 616 S.W2d 49, 32 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 35 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981)). For
example, for products with a long shelf life, the consumer's claim against the retailer might be sus-
tainable even though the retailer's or wholesaler's claim against the manufacturer is barred by the
statute of limitations.
41. Id., 56 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 352 (citing Old Albany Estates, Ltd. v. Highland Carpet
Mills, Inc., 604 P.2d 849, 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 368 (Okla. 1979) (noting that requiring
privity would result in chain of lawsuits to reach manufacturer)).
42. Id., 56 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 352 (citing Spring Motors Distrib., Inc. v. Ford Motor
Co., 489 A.2d 660 (N.J. 1985)).
43. Id. at 957-58, 56 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 353 (citing Hiles Co. v. Johnston Pump Co.,
560 P2d 154, 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 568 (Nev. 1977) (noting no valid reason to differentiate
between economic loss and recovery for personal injury or property damage); Groppel Co. v. U.S.
Gypsum Co., 616 S.W2d 49, 32 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 35 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (finding it
unjust to deny potentially devastating economic loss when minor personal injury or property damage
is directly recoverable from manufacturer)).
44. Goodin, 822 N.E.2d at 958, 56 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 354 (discussing the effect of
implied warranty of merchantability and Magnusson-Moss Warranty Act on parties' freedom to
bargain).
45. See infra notes 98-112 and accompanying text.
46. Goodin, 822 N.E.2d at 959, 56 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 355.
47. 369 F Supp. 2d 1350, 57 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 280 (N.D. Ga. 2005).
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for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability under Georgia law because
Georgia adhered to the privity requirement in contract claims and breach of war-




In Caterpillar Inc. v. Usinor Industeel,49 the court held that Illinois law required
privity of contract in an action for breach of warranty, even though the remote
buyer, Caterpillar, had been involved in selecting the allegedly defective steel used
to manufacture truck bodies based on the manufacturer's representations made
directly to Caterpillar. Caterpillar, however, did not directly buy the steel; several
companies that manufactured truck bodies for Caterpillar purchased the steel on
Caterpillar's advice from the North American distributor and alleged agent of the
manufacturer. The court ruled that, despite the direct contact the manufacturer
had with Caterpillar, Illinois law required either privity of contract or an assign-
ment of the warranty for a remote buyer to sue a remote seller of the defective
good.50 Because Caterpillar had not purchased the steel directly, it had no claim
for breach of express or implied warranties. 51
Caterpillar argued there was an exception to the privity requirement where a
manufacturer knows the identity, purpose, and requirements of the ultimate buyer
and the goods are manufactured specifically to meet those requirements. 52 The
court first expressed doubt as to whether Illinois recognized such an exception.
5 3
The court then found that the case was not within any such exception because
the manufacturer had not fabricated the steel for Caterpillar's needs. Indeed, Cat-
erpillar had told the manufacturer of its particular needs only after Caterpillar




In Wilson v. Brawn of California, Inc. 55 an Internet clothes seller (Brawn) charged
delivery and insurance fees on all orders and promised to replace any items lost
or damage in transit. The plaintiffs challenged the insurance fee as an unfair trade
practice, arguing that Brawn bore the risk of loss during transit as a matter of law;
therefore, despite charging customers a $1.48 "insurance fee," Brawn was not
assuming any risk it did not already bear. The trial court agreed but the appellate
court did not, ruling that, because the contract was a shipment contract, the risk
of loss passed to the plaintiffs once Brawn delivered the goods to the carrier;
48. Id. at 1361, 57 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 293.
49. 393 F Supp. 2d 659, 56 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 931 (N.D. I11. 2005).
50. Id. at 677, 56 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 941-42.
51. Id. at 677-78, 56 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 941-44.
52. Id. at 678, 56 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 942.
53. Id., 56 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 942 (citing Rothe v. Maloney Cadillac, Inc., 518 N.E.2d
1028, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 283 (I1. 1988), and Szajna v. Gen. Motors Corp., 503
N.E.2d 760, 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1268 (111. 1986), neither of which mentioned any
such exception).
54. Id. at 679, 56 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 943.
55. 33 Cal. Rptr. 3d 769, 58 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 300 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005).
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therefore, by promising to replace any items lost or damaged in transit, Brawn
was offering value in exchange for the insurance fee. 56
ACCEPTANCE, REJECTION, AND REVOCATION
In Deaver v. Auction Block Co.,57 an online fish auctioneer (Auction Block) issued
Deaver a "fish ticket" for and took delivery of his halibut catch, which Auction
Block then resold at auction to the ultimate buyer, Seafood Products. The fish
ticket, a standard form issued by the Alaska Department of Fish & Game, iden-
tified Auction Block as the buyer of Deaver's halibut. The ticket indicated that
Auction Block received Deaver's halibut, specified a price of $2.60 per pound,
and made no allowance in the price for less than premium quality fish. 58 Seafood
Products' bid provided a fifteen percent price reduction for "number two" quality
halibut. After Seafood Products received the fish from Auction Block and graded
them, it found many of the fish (some 19,000 pounds worth) to be of "number
two" quality because Auction Block apparently stored them in refrigerated sea
water. As a result, Seafood Products paid Auction Block only $2.21 per pound
for the 19,000 pounds of "number two" halibut. In turn, Auction Block, which
did not pay Deaver until Seafood Products paid it, paid Deaver less than the $2.60
per pound indicated on the fish ticket-specifically, Auction Block paid Deaver
what Seafood Products paid Auction Block, less a commission.5 9
Deaver sued. Reversing the superior court's dismissal of Deaver's Article 2
claims, the Alaska Supreme Court first held that Auction Block was an Article 2
buyer despite its and Deaver's understanding that it was merely providing a (vir-
tual) marketplace for Deaver's goods. The court then concluded that Deaver's
uncontested affidavit testimony that "he confirmed with Auction Block personnel
on site that the fish were in 'excellent condition"' established that Auction Block
"had the opportunity to inspect the fish." Because Auction Block "did not indicate
to Deaver that any defects were present," Auction Block "accepted" the fish "within
the meaning of the UCC."60
In Toshiba Machine Co. v. SPM Flow Control, Inc. ,6 SPM purchased two machine
tools from Toshiba in 1998 for use in SPM's manufacture of heavy-duty oilfield
pumps. Toshiba overcame SPM's initial hesitancy to purchase the first machine
tool (the BMC-1000) by assuring SPM that Toshiba had developed new "orbit
boring" software that would enable the BMC-1000 to perform the work SPM
56. Id. at 771-72, 58 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 302-03 (relying on U.C.C. §§ 2-503 and 2-
509 (2002)). The court noted that charging for insurance in a shipment contract is not unusual. In
fact, it something the Code expressly contemplates as part of a "C.L.E" (cost, insurance, and freight)
term. See id. at 772-73, 58 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 303-04 (citing U.C.C. § 2-320).
57. 107 P.3d 884, 56 U.C.C. Rep. Serv 2d (West) 392 (Alaska 2005).
58. See id. at 886, 56 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 394.
59. See id. at 886-87, 56 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 396-97.
60. Id. at 892, 56 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 398.
61. 180 S.W3d 761 (Tex. App. 2005). Like Enpro Systems, discussed supra in text accompanying
note 8, Toshiba Machine thoughtfully discusses a number of Article 2 issues in addition to those
discussed herein and should be on every commercial lawyer's reading list.
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needed substantially quicker than SPM's existing equipment. Toshiba delivered
the BMC-1000 in March 1998 and dispatched a programmer to install the soft-
ware on the BMC-1000. The programmer was unable to make the BMC-1000
perform to SPM's requirements despite repeated attempts. SPM offered to return
the BMC-1000 to Toshiba for a refund of SPM's downpayment, but Toshiba as-
sured BMC that a software solution was imminent. Thus assured, SPM ordered a
second machine tool (the BMC-800) from Toshiba in July 1998. Toshiba refused
to ship the BMC-800 until SPM paid the balance due on the BMC-1000; so, SPM
paid Toshiba the $742,500 due on the BMC-1000 and Toshiba shipped the BMC-
800. SPM experienced similar performance problems with the BMC-800 and nei-
ther tool ever reduced SPM's production time by more than a fraction of the
amount Toshiba had promised. SPM eventually purchased replacement tools from
another manufacturer.
62
SPM sued and Toshiba counterclaimed for the unpaid balance on the BMC-
800. The jury found for SPM, concluding that it had accepted but then revoked
its acceptance of the machines. Toshiba appealed, arguing that SPM's extensive
use of the BMC-1000 and BMC-800 precluded revocation. The court of appeals
affirmed. Citing a number of cases, including the well-known North American
Lighting, Inc. v. Hopkins Manufacturing Corp. ,63 the court of appeals held that SPM's
use of the tools was reasonable in light of Toshiba's repeated assurances that a
solution was forthcoming and, later, in order to mitigate its damages.64
ANTICIPATORY REPUDIATION
Anticipatory repudiation can result from any action or language that reasonably
indicates a party's refusal to perform or intention not to perform.65 In Ewanchuk
v. Mitchell,66 the Missouri Court of Appeals held that repudiation can also result
from a refusal to accept the other party's performance. The case involved a Mis-
souri buyer who orally agreed to purchase two unique red and white Boston
Terrier puppies from a breeder in Alberta, Canada. The buyer paid for the puppies;
however, the parties could not agree on a delivery method. The buyer insisted
that the puppies be shipped by air in one crate and the seller refused, fearing the
puppies would fight and injure themselves. When alternative delivery options fell
through, the seller offered to return the buyer's money The buyer refused the
offer and sued for specific performance. 67
The trial court entered judgment for the seller, ruling that the parties had not
reached agreement on all essential terms and therefore there was no "meeting of
the minds" and no contract.68 Noting that Article 2 requires only that the parties
62. See Toshiba Machine, 180 S.W3d at 768-70.
63. 37 F3d 1253, 24 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1061 (7th Cir. 1994).
64. Toshiba Machine, 180 S.W3d at 772-75.
65. See U.C.C. § 2-610 & cmt. 2 (2002). See generally Keith A. Rowley, A Brief History of Anticipatory
Repudiation in American Contract Law, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 565 (2001).
66. 154 S.W3d 476, 56 U.C.C. Rep. Serv 2d (West) 261 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005).
67. See id. at 477-78, 56 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 264-66.
68. Id. at 480, 56 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 266.
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intend to be bound and that a court have a basis to provide a remedy,69 the
appellate court found that the parties had formed a contract because both parties
admitted its existence and payment was made and accepted. The open delivery
term could be filled in by the provisions of the Code; 70 therefore, the contract
would not fail for indefiniteness.
71
Nevertheless, the court upheld the judgment for the seller, ruling that the buyer,
not the seller, had repudiated the contract. Because the buyer refused to take
delivery of the puppies in Canada, and the Code did not give the buyer the right
to insist on a particular method of delivery, the buyer repudiated the contract by
words or conduct indicating his intent not to perform. 72 After the buyer's repu-
diation, the seller was entitled to cancel the contract because the repudiation
impaired the value of the contract to the seller, given the age of the puppies.
73
REMEDIES
In the most interesting of a rather sparse group of remedies cases, a divided
Wisconsin Supreme Court dealt with the scope of the "special circumstances"
exception in section 2-714(2) to normal market damages in Mayberry v. Volks-
wagen of America, Inc.7 1 Mayberry purchased an automobile from one of the de-
fendant's dealers for $18,526. The automobile carried a two year/24,000 mile
repair-or-replace warranty. After about a year of frequent trips to the dealer's repair
shop, Mayberry sought to revoke her acceptance and sue for damages. Volkswagen
refused the revocation. Mayberry continued to drive the auto, logging over 32,000
miles before she traded it in, receiving a $15,100 trade-in allowance, which ex-
ceeded the fair market value of the car at the time of trade-in ($14,200, according
to the NADA Official Used Car Guide). The trial court granted Volkswagen sum-
mary judgment, holding that Mayberry's continued use barred revocation and
that her trade-in exceeded the fair market value, thus barring any damages claim.
The intermediate appellate court reversed.
Before the Wisconsin Supreme Court, Volkswagen argued that Mayberry was
not entitled to recover breach of warranty damages measured by diminution in
value under section 2-714(2) because "special circumstances"-namely, her hav-
ing continued to use the car for an extended period and then traded it in for more
than its fair market value-would cause Mayberry to realize a windfall. The court
held the "special circumstances" test inapplicable. Mayberry sought merely her
lost value, which is precisely the purpose of the section. As a result, the standard
test of section 2-714(2), measuring the difference at the time and place of accep-
69. Id. at 481, 56 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 268; see U.C.C. § 2-204(3) (2002).
70. See U.C.C. §§ 2-308 & 2-309 (providing, in the absence of the parties' agreement, that delivery
is to be made within reasonable time at the seller's location).
71. Ewanchuk, 154 S.W3d at 481, 56 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 268.
72. Id. at 481-82, 56 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 268-69.
73. See U.C.C. § 2-610 (permitting an aggrieved party to resort to any remedy for breach if repu-
diation substantially impairs value of contract to him); U.C.C. § 2-703 (permitting an aggrieved seller
to cancel its contract).
74. 692 N.W2d 226, 56 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 214 (Wis. 2005).
HeinOnline -- 61 Bus. Law 1554 2005-2006
Sales 1555
tance (not resale) between the value of the goods as promised and as delivered,
would govern. Her continued use was irrelevant because she sought not to undo
the deal, but to recover her lost value. Nor would Mayberry's gain from resale bar
her recovery, though the court thought it might be relevant to mitigation. The
court warned, though, that Mayberry's resale price "may be probative as to the
value of the vehicle with defects at the time and place of acceptance. '"75 Three
justices issued a concurring opinion (written, curiously enough, by the author of
the majority opinion) finding the "special circumstances" test relevant to allow
the plaintiffs damages to be adjusted to conform to her actual damages.7 6 This,
thought the concurring justices, was consistent with the Article 1 directive to
grant expectation. 7 So, Mayberry's profit from resale should be lowered to reduce
her damages; otherwise, "the duty to mitigate would be meaningless."78
The general points made in the court's opinion seem reasonable enough, but
it and the concurrence contain some unfortunate dicta with respect to determining
value. The discussions of resale price and value overstate the pertinence of resale
price. True, prompt resale provides some evidence of the value of the goods at the
time of purchase-but only some. First, value and price are not the same. Value
accounts for idiosyncratic worth in a way that price does not. 9 Second, even if
the buyer attaches no personal value to the goods, using resale price as a measure
of initial value ignores the possibility that the buyer may have made a particularly
good deal on resale. Possibly the goods appreciated (unlikely here, to be sure).80
Possibly the buyer was a very shrewd bargainer on resale. Possibly the resale price
was high because the buyer took less favorable terms elsewhere, whether on the
price of the purchased auto or on her credit terms. Relying too heavily upon resale
price assumes a smooth market with resale prices that do not reflect skill, on the
one hand, or subsidization, on the other-strongish assumptions for the used car
market, to say the least.
Nor is it sound to assume that any profit made by the buyer must go toward
mitigating the seller's damages. To start, the concurrence's recital of a duty to
mitigate is regrettable, if common. There is no duty to mitigate. If a breached-
against party fails to mitigate, it will be treated as though it had; it will not have
breached a duty with a resulting cause of action."' Leaving this solecism aside,
why should the buyer be deprived of the fruits of a favorable bargain? If a
75. Id. at 239, 56 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 228. The court cited a number of authorities,
including White and Summers, to the effect that "the price obtained for defective goods on resale is
probative as to the value of the goods actually received." Id.
76. Id. at 240-41, 56 UC.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 230-31 (Wilcox, J, concurring) (citing 1 Roy
RYDEN ANDERSON, DAMAGES UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 10:10 (2d ed. 2003)).
77. See U.C.C. § 1-305(a) (2002).
78. Mayberry, 692 N.W2d at 243, 56 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 234 (Wilcox, J., concurring).
The same would apply to value added by successful repairs. See id.
79. See, e.g., Ellen A. Peters, Remedies for Breach of Contract Relating to the Sale of Goods Under the
Uniform Commercial Code: A Roadmap for Article Two, 73 YALE L.J. 199, 269 (1963).
80. Cf Camrosa County Water Dist. v. Southwest Welding & Mfg. Co., 123 Cal. Rptr. 93, 17
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 780 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975) (buyer could recover as damages any increase
in repair cost between the time breach was discovered and the time of trial).
81. See, e.g., 3 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 12.12, at 231 (3d ed. 2004).
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breached-against seller resells at a profit, the Code provides that she may keep
any gains, rather than use them to reduce the buyer's damages.8 2 A breached-
against buyer should have the same rights, which give her an appropriate incentive
to resell as effectively as possible. Mitigation requires that the buyer make rea-
sonable efforts to reduce damages, not to give up any gain that it might realize
from its superior abilities.8 3 None of this is to say that resale price is irrelevant.
But, making resale price probative requires that one make a great many assump-
tions about the resale market, and courts and litigators should be prepared to test
these before jumping too easily to that conclusion.
Another decision used U.C.C. section 2-714 to devastating effect. In Dixie Gas
& Food, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co.,84 operators of gas station franchises alleged that Shell
failed to act in good faith in setting prices under an open price term;8 5 and, thus,
that they should receive damages. Because the plaintiffs failed to allege that they
had notified Shell of its breaches, Shell moved to dismiss. The court granted Shell's
motion, holding that the plaintiffs' failure to allege giving notice of the non-
conformities in pricing before filing suit warranted dismissal under section 2-
714(1).86
The court may have reached a sensible result, but may have reached it pre-
maturely It was correct that section 2-714 applies to cases involving errant pric-
ing. Though most section 2-714 cases deal with breaches of warranties of quality,
subsection one refers to "damages for any non-conformity of tender" and U.C.C.
section 2-106(2) defines "conforming" in terms of the obligations of the contract.8 7
Here, the obligations include the statutory duty of good faith under U.C.C. section
2-305(2). In any event, U.C.C. sections 2-712 and 2-713 apply only when the
buyer has not accepted the goods; here, the plaintiffs had. The court was correct
to apply section 2-714 and, thus, to import the notice rules of U.C.C. section 2-
607(3)(a). However, the court may have ruled precipitously. True, the filing of a
complaint is usually insufficient to constitute timely notice under section 2-
607(3)(a), particularly when, as here, the buyers are merchants.8 8 But this is not
inevitable. If Shell knew of its breach already, the buyer's notice would serve no
purpose and should not be required 89--particularly if cure or settlement would
82. U.C.C. § 2-706(6) (2002).
83. In any event, the reselling buyer might have been able to exact an even better price from its
buyer had the goods been as promised.
84. No. 03 C 8210, 2005 WL 1273273, 57 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 976 (N.D. Ill. May 25,
2005).
85. U.C.C. § 2-305(2) (2002).
86. Dixie Gas, 2005 WL 1273273, at *7, 57 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 979.
87. Article 1 defines contract as "the total legal obligation that results from the parties' agreement,"
which includes default terms. U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(12) (2002).
88. Dixie Gas, 2005 WL 1273273, at *6, 57 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 979 (citing Tudor v.
Jewel Food Stores, Inc. 681 N.E.2d 6, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv 2d (West) 132 (II. App. Ct. 1997)); see
also, e.g., Williams v. Mozark Fire Extinguisher Co., 888 S.W2d 303, 26 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Cal-
laghan) 1116 (Ark. 1994); Connick v. Suzuki Motor Co., 675 N.E.2d 584, 30 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d
(Callaghan) 709 (II. 1996); Northwest Truck & Trailer Sales, Inc. v. Dvorak, 887 P.2d 260, 25 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1124 (Mont. 1994).
89. See 1 JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 11-10, at 611 n.1
(4th ed. 1995); see, e.g., McDonald's Corp. v. Watson, 69 F3d 36, 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan)
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likely not have been advanced by notice. 90 Notice is not innately virtuous. If
requiring it permits cure with consequent reductions in liability, allows sellers to
prepare for negotiation and litigation, cuts off tardy claims, or gives suitable peace
to the uneasy, then courts might fairly be strict about it in commercial settings.
Otherwise, though, such a requirement has the vice of cutting off an otherwise
meritorious claim with no countervailing virtue save consistency The court could
have denied a motion to dismiss and allowed the parties to demonstrate or deny
the effects of late notice.91
If a limited remedy fails of its essential purpose, the injured party may recover
damages provided for in the Code without regard to the limitation.92 Atwell v.
Beckwith Machinery Co.93 presented an unusual variation on an exclusive remedy's
failure of essential purpose. Atwell contracted to purchase a "Caterpillar Certified
Rebuild" tractor from Beckwith. Instead it received a "Beckwith Rebuild." A Cat-
erpillar Certified Rebuild has had all parts on a particular list replaced, while a
Beckwith Rebuild has only unusable parts replaced. Atwell sued for breach of
warranty and recovered damages under section 2-714(2). Among the defenses
Beckwith asserted at trial was a contractual limitation on remedies, which gave
Atwell only the right to have defective parts repaired or replaced. The trial court
held that this limitation did not apply because the issue was not the repair of
defective goods, but the delivery of a non-conforming machine. The appellate
court affirmed, though on a slightly different ground. It applied U.C.C. section
2-719(2) and held that the limitation failed of its essential purpose by depriving
Atwell of the substantial value of its bargain. 91 Were Beckwith to repair or replace
only the defective parts, it would provide Atwell with a Beckwith Rebuild, not
the Caterpillar Rebuild for which Atwell had contracted.
This seems a sound result, reached on the whole by sound reasoning. Ordinarily
this section provides something of a lemon law, where attempts at repair have
proved unavailing and the goods will not perform as promised. 95 Alternatively, it
can provide a method of recovery when the contractual remedy cannot be per-
formed because of the seller's breach-if, for example, the warranted product is
174 (5th Cir. 1995) (applying Illinois law); Connick v. Suzuki Motor Co., 675 N.E.2d 584, 30 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 709 (111. 1996).
90. See, e.g., In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tires Prod. Liab. Litig., 155 F Supp. 2d 1069, 45
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 516 (S.D. Ind. 2001), reversed in part, 288 F3d 1012 (7th Cir. 2002),
cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1105 (2003); City of Wichita, Kansas v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 828 F Supp. 851,
23 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 96 (D. Kan. 1993), affd in part, revd in part on other grounds, 72
F3d 1491 (10th Cir. 1996); Mullins v. Wyatt, 887 S.W2d 356, 25 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan)
715 (Ky 1994).
91. Amended Article 2 would have changed the result in this case. It provides that failure to give
timely notice does not bar a claim, but merely "bars the buyer from a remedy only to the extent that
seller is prejudiced by the failure." Amended U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a) (2003).
92. U.C.C. § 2-719(2) (2002).
93. 872 A.2d 1216, 57 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 225 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005).
94. Id. at 1224, 57 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 232; see U.C.C. § 2-719 cmt. 1 (2002).
95. See GREGORY M. TRAVALIO ET AL., NORDSTROM ON SALES & LEASES OF GOODS § 4.08[D], at 478
(2d ed. 2000); see also, e.g., Clark v. Int'l Harvester Co., 581 P2d 784, 25 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
91 (Idaho 1978); Razor v. Hyundai Motor Am., 813 N.E.2d 247, 54 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 737
(Ill. App. Ct. 2004), affd in part, rev'd in part, No. 98813, 2006 WL 1765427 (111. June 29, 2006).
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destroyed because of a breach of warranty and the remedy provides merely for
repair or replacement of defective parts.96 Here the problem is that the remedy
would yield goods inferior to those promised. While this is in a sense true when-
ever new goods must be repaired, here the difference was greater; Beckwith's
failure to replace working parts on the Caterpillar list meant that the tractor was
simply a different type.97
ECONOMIC Loss RULE
The economic loss rule bars recovery in tort for purely economic injuries arising
from a breach of warranty98 In The Conveyer Co. v. SunSource Technology Services,
Inc.,99 Conveyer purchased a lifting device from SunSource, which Conveyer in-
corporated into a "stinger stacker" and then sold to a customer. Only weeks after
Conveyor delivered the stacker to the customer, it collapsed due to the noncon-
formity of SunSource's lifting device. Conveyor sued for breach of the implied
warranty of merchantability, strict product liability, and negligent misrepresenta-
tion. The trial court denied SunSource's motion for summary judgment on the
merchantability claim, but granted summary judgment against Conveyor on its
strict product liability and negligent misrepresentation claims, invoking the eco-
nomic loss rule. 0
In Sanitarios Lamosa, S.A. de C. V v. DBHL, Inc.,101 a plaintiff argued that it could
pursue tort claims without being barred by the economic loss rule for three rea-
sons. First, the plaintiff, a manufacturer of toilets into which it installed allegedly
defective ballcocks designed by one of the defendants, argued that damage to
reputation is not economic loss under Texas law.'0 2 The plaintiff relied on a section
of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code that includes "injury to reputation"
in a definition of "noneconomic damages."'03 The court rejected this reasoning,
holding that court-made rules regarding causes of action, rather than statutory
definitions governing types of damages, determine whether a claim sounds in tort
96. See, e.g., Champlain Enters., Inc. v. United States, 957 F Supp. 26, 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d
(West) 1058 (N.D.N.Y. 1997); Russo v. Hilltop Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 479 S.W2d 211, 10 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 768 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972).
97. See, e.g., J.S. McCarthy Co. v. Brausse Diecutting & Converting Equip., Inc., No. Civ. A. 04-
107-B-W, 2005 WL 946318, 57 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 272 (D. Me. Ap. 22, 2005) (issue of fact
whether proper goods delivered; if not, repair or replace remedy would not be sufficient), report and
recommendation adopted, 2005 WL 1411895 (D. Me. June 14, 2005); cf. Forest River, Inc. v. Posten,
847 So. 2d 957, 51 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 711 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002) (repair-or-replace remedy
would fail of its essential purpose where it would not restore vehicle to its fair market value).
98. See Hyundai Motor Am., Inc. v. Goodin, 822 N.E.2d 947, 958, 56 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West)
339, 353 (Ind. 2005).
99. 398 F Supp. 2d 992 (N.D. Iowa 2005).
100. See id. at 995.
101. No. Civ. A. H-04-2973, 2005 WL 2405923, 58 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 534 (S.D. Tex.
Sept. 29, 2005).
102. Id. at *3, 58 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 538.
103. Id., 58 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 538 (citing TEX. Civ. PiAc. & REM. CODE § 41.001(12)).
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or contract. 't4Under Texas law, a plaintiff must show either injury to property
other than the product sold or "concrete, physical injury," not merely "injury to
plaintiffs interests.' ' 0
5
Second, the plaintiff argued that its claims fell within the "mitigation of im-
minent harm" exception to the economic loss rule. Under this exception, a plain-
tiff who voluntarily injures its own property, other than the property that is the
subject of the contract, may be able to avoid dismissal under the economic loss
rule. 0 6 Because the plaintiff had damaged some of its toilets by removing the
defective ballcocks to mitigate damages that might be caused by selling toilets
that leaked, the court held that the claim was not barred by the economic loss
rule. 107
Third, the plaintiff argued that the defective ballcocks caused damage to plain-
tiffs "product line." While this argument was not adequately briefed, and therefore
not decided by the court, the court did address whether damage by a component
to a product into which the component was installed constitutes damage to "other
property" The court held that it does not; thus, damage to toilet tanks caused by
malfunctioning ballcocks was barred by the economic loss doctrine.10 8
In a case of first impression, the Wisconsin Supreme Court decided that the
economic loss rule does not bar a claim for intentional misrepresentation, i.e.,
fraud in the inducement. 0 9 Noting that courts have taken three approaches to
an intentional misrepresentation exception to economic loss rule preclusion of
claims," 0 the Wisconsin court adopted a narrow fraud in the inducement excep-
104. Id., 58 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 538.
105. Id. at *4, 58 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 539.
106. Id., 58 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 540 (citing Corpus Christi Oil & Gas Co. v. Zapata
Gulf Marine Corp., 71 F3d 198 (5th Cir. 1995)).
107. Id., 58 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 540.
108. Id. at *6, 58 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 542 (citing Hininger v. Case Corp., 23 E 3d 124
(5th Cir. 1994), and Alcon Aluminum Corp. v. BASF Corp., 133 F Supp. 2d 482, 44 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 2d (West) 432 (N.D. Tex. 2001)); see also Milwaukee Mutual Ins. Co. v. Deere & Co., No. Civ.
04-4905 MJDJGL, 2005 WL 2105513, 58 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 121 (D. Minn. Aug. 26, 2005)
(holding that an excavator that caught fire and damaged a tree processor that had been installed on
the excavator did not fall within the "other property" exception to the economic loss rule). But see
Gunkel v. Renovations, Inc., 822 N.E.2d 150 (Ind. 2005) (holding that a homeowner could recover
in tort when a defective stone facade allowed water to damage other parts of his home); Indemnity
Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Am. Eurocopter LLC, No. 1:03CV 949, 2005 WL 1610653 (M.D.N.C. July 8,
2005) (allowing a purchaser of a helicopter to pursue a tort claim against the manufacturer of a
defective gearbox that was installed into the helicopter).
109. Kaloti Enters., Inc. v. Kellogg Sales Co., 699 N.W2d 205 (Wis. 2005).
110. The court described the three positions as "(1) no exception; (2) a general exception for all
fraud in the inducement claims; and (3) a narrow exception for fraud in the inducement where the
fraud is not interwoven with the quality or character of the goods for which the parties contracted or
otherwise involved performance of the contract." Id. at 217. Interestingly, federal courts applying
Wisconsin law had, at various times, predicted that the Wisconsin courts would adopt each of the
three approaches. Id. at 218 (citing Cooper Power Sys., Inc. v. Union Carbide Chems. & Plastics Co.,
123 E3d 675, 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 803 (7th Cir. 1997), Budgetel Inns, Inc. v. Micros Sys.,
Inc., 8 F Supp. 2d 1137, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 1073 (E.D. Wis. 1998), and Raytheon Co.
v. McGraw-Edison Co., 979 E Supp. 858 (E.D. Wis. 1997)).
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tion. The court described the exception as not barring a claim "where the fraud
is extraneous to, rather than interwoven with, the contract.""' A strong dissenting
opinion described that limited exception as defying "consistent and principled
application."" 2
111. Id. at 219.
112. Id. at 226 (Abramanson, J., dissenting).
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